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failing to restrain radicalisation? 
 





This paper explores why the Prevent strand of the UK Government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST, is failing to achieve success in reducing radicalisation of young 
Muslims. By refusing to engage with extremists, and denying ‘extreme’ ideas a platform for 
expression, this paper will explain how the importance of cultural-linguistic epistemologies, 
and their role in extremism, has been overlooked. Rather than striving to understand how 
socio-political factors influence one’s reading of religious doctrines or interpretation of 
ideology, Prevent understands ideology to be the core radicalising agent, used by influential 
figures who can exploit the grievances of the vulnerable. The problematic repercussions of 
this will be addressed throughout, highlighting the various, and extensive, criticisms that 
Prevent has faced from academics, practitioners and commentators – primarily that it is 
counter-productive. The importance of the post-9/11 neoconservative paradigm in 
underpinning Prevent will be explained, but a Neo-Weberian approach, as a better lens 
through which to understand radicalisation, will be proposed, to ultimately trump the 
simplistic, yet currently dominant, ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory. Based on this, recommendations 
are made for an improved Prevent, rooted in the notion that radicalisation, extremism, or 
terrorism cannot be prevented, without knowing the motives, the views, and the assumptions 
of the radicals, the extremists, and those vulnerable to engaging with them.   
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Introduction: Soul Searching  
 
Kepel commented as early as 2004 (in Ranstorp 2010:3) that, 
 
“The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the 
next decades will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in (the) 
communities of believers on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other 
European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West.” 
 
It is interesting to note that this comment came prior to the 7/7 London bombings, the Charlie 
Hebdo attack, the November 2015 Paris attacks, the Brussels attack of March 2016, and the 
various attacks Germany has witnessed this year.  
In light of these events, this paper strives to explore what it is that drives people to 
come under the influence of extremist ideologies, to be radicalised, and compare the reality of 
this situation to how it is interpreted and expressed in the UK government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST, specifically in the Prevent strand. The view presented in this paper is 
that radicalisation cannot be prevented without understanding what causes it, but the UK 
government is failing to adequately understand the grievances of those it deems vulnerable to 
radicalisation, and their approach is even perpetuating some of these core grievances. By 
focusing on ideology as the main problem, the main cause of radicalisation, the government is 
failing to contextualise extremists’ interpretations of religious doctrines, as well as real world 
events, which is undermining the success the government can hope to achieve under Prevent.  
Given that the UK has provided more foreign fighters to ISIS than fragile-states such 
as Somalia, as well as other Western European and Nordic countries, including Austria, Italy, 
Norway and Denmark, it has been suggested, including by former MI5 chief, Baroness 
Manningham-Buller (HL Deb 2015, vol 758,col 752), that some assumptions held by the 
government regarding counter-terrorism should be called into question (Stern and Berger 
2015:249; Neumann 2015). At present, as expressed by David Anderson QC (2016a:1), 
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The Prevent strategy will be critiqued throughout this paper for its inadequate 
understanding of the wide-ranging and often deep-seated ‘causes’ of radicalisation. Githens-
Mazer (2010b:999) has justifiably praised Ranstorp’s (2009) identification of radicalisation’s 
“multifaceted combination of push-pull factors involving a combination of socio-
psychological factors, political grievance, religious motivation and discourse, identity politics 
and triggering mechanisms,” to which this paper only adds economic factors, since, although 
often overstated, they do play some role. Despite the need for a multifaceted response though, 
the battle to win hearts and minds has become a problematic “conflation and muddle of…a 
counter-subversion strategy, a ‘battle of ideas’ strategy and a surveillance and intelligence-
gathering strategy” (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2009, in Elshimi 2015a:206). This means an 
“intervention” under Prevent may come in the form of “mentoring, counselling, theological 
support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks2 or providing 
mainstream services3” (HM Government 2015c:21). Scholars, such as Elshimi (2015b:115-
116) and Gutkowski (2011, in Bishop 2014:240), therefore have come to understand the 
concept of de-radicalisation through Foucault’s “technologies of the self,” whereby 
individuals can “transform themselves” by performing certain “operations on their…thoughts, 
conduct, and the way of being.”  
The analysis of Prevent throughout this paper will focus on its efforts to de-radicalise 
Muslims, given that the government considers Islamic extremism, Al Qa’ida ideology and 
ISIS,4 to pose the biggest threat to UK security, making it the emphasis of Prevent (HM 
Government 2011:59, 62). Also, training materials and indicators for the strategy primarily 
focus on Islam, even though Prevent states that it does aim to tackle all extremist ideologies 
(Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013:9; Elshimi 2015b:121).  
Following an examination of Prevent’s political and theoretical history, section one 
will explore problematic definitions and understandings, and innovatively ground the analysis 
of Prevent in academic epistemological debate. Section two will explore Prevent’s 
understanding that young Muslims with grievances are exploited by extremist ideology, but 
will ultimately dispute the government’s understanding that ideology is the main threat, 
arguing instead the case for wider socio-political factors. Section three will delve deeper into 
                                                 
2 Family; peers. 
3 Education; employment; health; finance; housing. 
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the concept of extremism, and how it is defined, exploring what this means both for young 
Muslims, but also more widely for the legitimacy of the concept. Section four will move 
towards evaluating Prevent on its own terms, looking at the extent to which the aims it lays 
out have been, or can be, met, which will include an in-depth look at the Channel programme 
as a key intervention. The conclusion will lay out recommendations for an improved Prevent 
strategy, grounded in the idea that the government should be engaging with a wider ideas-base 
than they are currently prepared to, which will aid an appreciation of the importance of lived 
experience in interpreting religious ideas and doctrines.  
 
Tell me, Prevent, where do your origins lie? 
 
Initially conceptualised in 2003, following the 2001 9/11 terrorist attack on the US, Prevent is 
one of four strands of CONTEST,5 although the Prevent element was “entirely undeveloped” 
at this time (Thomas, P. 2015a:170). CONTEST was updated in 2006, in response to the 7/7 
attack of 2005, presenting Prevent as a “hearts and minds” approach to countering Islamic 
terrorism (O’Toole et al 2015:3; Khaleeli 2015), and further developed in 2011, to reflect the 
change from a Labour to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, aiming for 
more challenge to terrorist ideology in a transformation of approach towards counter-
terrorism policing (HM Government 2011:61).6 Now with an annual budget of approximately 
£40 million, Prevent moved from a focus on preventing violent extremism to preventing (non-
violent) extremism, under David Cameron’s premiership, expected to continue under his 
                                                 
5 The other strands of CONTEST are: Pursue, dealing with surveillance and detection; Prepare, dealing with civil 
emergency contingency planning; and Protect, which oversees domestic security (O’Toole et al 2015:3).  The 
architect of this multi-dimensional strategy is considered to be Professor Sir David Omand (Huband 2010:139; 
Thomas, P. 2015b:40). 
6 The cost of programme through its development is a cause of contention. By 2011, almost £80 million had been 
spent on 1,000 schemes across 94 local authorities, according to Casciani (2014), although P. Thomas 
(2015b:39) cites the figure at £140 million, whereas Kundnani (2009:6) cites £140 million as the 2008/09 budget 
alone. Policy Exchange on the other hand cites the budget as £90 million for 2006-2009 (Maher and Frampton 
2009:5). This exemplifies the lack of transparency and consequential discrepancies surrounding Prevent, 
encouraging criticism. Until 2008 though the strategy was only aimed at local authorities with a population of 
5% or more Muslims, demonstrating the “painfully thin” evidence used for the strategy’s early development 
(Thomas, P. 2015b:39; Thomas, P. 2010, in Thomas, P. 2015b:44). This was also core to internal government 
struggles regarding whether Prevent should come under the remit of the Home Office, or the Department for 
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successor, Theresa May, and is at the centre of counter-terrorism efforts (Gardner 2015; 
Halliday and Dodd 2015).  
The aims of Prevent, and therefore how it determines success, are to achieve: 
(1) A “reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in (the UK) and in states overseas 
whose security most impacts (that of the UK),”  
(2) “More effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist 
organisations and used by terrorists to legitimise violence,” and  
(3) “More challenge to and isolation of extremists and terrorists operating on the 
internet.”7         
(HM Government 2011:60)  
 
The objectives of Prevent, and the approaches via which aims will be achieved, are to: 
 
(1) “Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those 
who promote it,”  
 
(2) “Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given 
appropriate advice and support,” and  
 
(3) “Work with a wide range of sectors8 where there are risks of radicalisation which we 
need to address.”  
(HM Government 2011:62)  
 
The Prevent ‘Duty’, a sub-policy,9 requires those who work to protect vulnerable 
people, or who are responsible for national security, to stage an intervention if they identify 
someone as vulnerable to radicalisation (HM Government 2015c:3). This intervention may 
include referral to the police-led multi-agency partnership for de-radicalisation, the Channel 
Programme.  
                                                 
7 Overseas work dealt with by FCO and DfID; not analysed in this paper due to lack of capacity to adequately 
address. Also a lack of capacity to adequately address issues around the internet; brief analysis in section four. 
8 Education; faith; health; internet; criminal justice. 
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This change of approach aims to stop the creation of an atmosphere that may be 
conducive to terrorism, where extremist views are popularised, even though it is not illegal to 
engage in ‘extremist’ activity (HM Government 2015c:3). It is related to this that critics, such 
as Miller and Sabir (2012), have branded Prevent a counter-insurgency strategy, framing their 
argument around why and how the strategy is unsuccessful. Government rhetoric, according 
to Kundnani (2015:8), “distorts public discourse, legitimises the erosion of civil rights and 
fosters social divisions.”10  
 
The Conveyor Belt of Radicalisation 
Prior to 9/11, Kundnani (2015:14; 2012:7) highlights Martha Crenshaw’s three levels 
of ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ as the most academic account of pathways into extremism, at a 
time when the term ‘radicalisation’ was not on the terrorism agenda. This framework 
included, firstly, individual motivation and system beliefs; secondly, decision-making and 
strategy within a terrorism movement; and finally, the wider political and social context with 
which terrorist movements interact (Crenshaw 1981, in Kundnani 2015:14). A key issue with 
contemporary theory that underpins Prevent is that it only considers the first of Crenshaw’s 
factors, significantly failing to address the deeper factors that lie within the wider context 
(Kundnani 2015:14). 
The ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory is the foundation of Prevent, which points to ideology as 
the “main precursor to violent extremism,” failing to give adequate consideration to feelings 
of grievance or deprivation (Hussain 2016). This identification of a set cause however, 
holding “predictive power,” is key to the strategy’s execution, as it is through the mapping of 
“linear progression of an ‘at-risk’ subjectivity towards violence” that intervention can be 
legitimised (Heath-Kelly 2013, and de Goede and Simon 2013, in Martin 2015:191). 
Critically branded “misguided” (Shafi11 2015, in Travis 2015), and an “entirely disingenuous” 
representation of reality (Lambert and Githens-Mazer 2009), the ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory 
poses that extremist Islamic groups like Al Qa’ida  or Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) have the ability to 
indoctrinate individuals with radical ideology, grooming them for recruitment by more violent 
                                                 
10 Sections two and three further deal with this critique. 
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organisations (Baran 2005).12 As such, it is argued they have benefitted from the freedom of 
speech in Western liberal democracies, where they could express messages that filled 
“people’s hearts and minds with hatred,” acting as a “vanguard for raising Muslim 
consciousness toward (violent) action” (Baran 2004; Husain 2007:275).  
Given the nature of Prevent, the Home Office is considered a proponent of the theory 
(Kherbane 2015), despite the Coalition government being presented with research expressing 
the inaccuracy of the theory’s linearity, which misreads radicalisation as occurring via a step-
by-step process (Gilligan 2010). Amin (2014), who is not aware of any “serious political 
commentator who argues for the correctness of the ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory,” suggests 
adopting a ‘funnel’ model instead, whereby “some people get more radicalised, while others 
flirt with some of these beliefs and then go back to being normal practicing Muslims.” While 
this model may be slightly more reflective of the radicalisation experience, it is still too 
simplistic to provide a serious understanding of the issue.13 
These foundational assumptions of Prevent, have been considerably influenced by 
America’s neoconservatives, prominent in developing the ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory (Hasan 
2011). Their paradigm assumes that “terrorists” fundamentally exude “moral intolerance and 
hatred for the West,” lacking “just cause” for their actions, which has provided justification 
for implementing controversial means of defeating them (Grovogui 2007:237-238). Since 
finding initial influence in the UK under the New Labour leadership of Tony Blair, these 
interpretations have been reinforced by successive governments, particularly via the 2013 
Prime Minister’s (PM) Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism (Kundnani 
2015:9, 11). British neoconservative think-tanks, including Policy Exchange, Centre for 
Social Cohesion (CSC), Henry Jackson Society (HJS), and Quilliam Foundation, appear to 
have provided significant guidance on Prevent’s development, specifically in framing the 
narrative that terrorism is caused by religious ideology, further demonstrated in Table A. This 
provides a, what some would consider worrying, and as such contested, evidence-base for 
terrorism prosecutions (Miller et al 2011:9, 52; Miller et al 2015; Bush 2015; Mohammad and 
Siddiqui 2013:26; Kundnani 2015:16-17). 
                                                 
12 Although HT have expressed active opposition to the extremely violent ISIS (Frances 2015).  
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More nuanced understandings of radicalisation, that would fall more in line with 
Crenshaw perhaps, could include Sageman’s (2004, 2007, 2008, in Christmann 2012:13) four-
stage approach, which includes, in no particular order, experiencing a “sense of ‘moral 
outrage’”, likely following an attack on Muslims abroad, for example in Bosnia or Iraq, “a 
specific interpretation of the world,” often where actions are seen to resonate with one’s 
personal life, especially, as Reinares et al (2008:15) note, if individuals have been in direct 
contact with those fighting in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, as well as having networks 
through which to mobilise, for example internet forums. Ideology is not the only, or even the 
central, factor here. Gill’s (2007, in Christmann 2012:14) pathway approach includes similar 
influencers as in Sageman’s understanding, and is it noted that, when applied to suicide 
bombers for example, while they may experience different stages at different times, each 
serves to reinforce the others. While, as Christmann (2012:16) rightly suggests, the small 
sample size of Wiktorowicz’s (2004, in Christmann 2012:15) study on the al-Muhajiroun 
pattern of radicalisation detracts from its ability to be applied as a universal understanding, its 
empirical grounding adds notable nuance to the argument that radicalisation involves much 
more than an influential ideology. It relies instead on an individual’s worldview influencing 
and being influenced by their understanding of a religious framework, aided by a group whose 
public image seems to align with the individuals concerns or interests, which leads to 
socialisation into potentially dangerous circles (Wiktorowicz 2004, in Christmann 2012:15). It 
is important to note though that these individuals are not by any means homogeneous, and, as 
Reinares et al’s (2008:11) research into the backgrounds of those behind the London and 
Madrid bombings notes, the origins and educational and cultural background of each 
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Table A - Neoconservative influences on Prevent  
 
Kundnani (2012:13) has suggested research undertaken by these groups downplays the 
importance of political and socioeconomic factors, to satisfy the theology-based agenda of 
policymakers, hence concerns regarding the lack of independence of these bodies (Miller and 
Mills 2015; Ali 2015:139; Babu 2015, in Halliday and Dodd 2015). 
 
Organisation  Policy Recommendation Evidence of Influence 
Policy Exchange 
(PE) 
 Founding Chairman, Michael Gove, former 
Justice Secretary, in his 2006 book (released 
the same year as PE 1st Islamism report) 
stated ‘fundamentalist terror’ is facilitated by 
‘sapping of confidence in Western values 
encouraged by the radical Left’ (Mills et al 
2011:6); notion featured frequently in PE 
reports 2006-09  
 2009 report heavily criticised government 
downplaying of link between non-violent and 
violent extremism 
 Also critical of engagement with any 
‘extremist’ groups14 (Maher & Frampton 
2009:5, 7, 8) 
 Rejection of British values now 
defines extremism (HM 
Government 2011:62) 
 Non-violent extremism now tackled 
(HM Government 2015c:3, 5) 
 No longer work with extremist 





 Director Douglas Murry (2010), proposed 
“British values” be taught as counter-
narrative, and ethnic / religious groups 
should receive integration ‘rewards’  
 Focus on: integration; ‘better’ 
counter-narrative (HM 
Government 2011:61, 64) 
                                                 
14 PE includes “organisations that oppose Armed Forces’ recruitment because they selectively oppose wars that 
the state…is currently fighting” (Maher and Frampton 2009:8); unrealistic perhaps considering over 1 million 




Lauren Powell: Counter-Productive Counter-Terrorism. How is the dysfunctional discourse of 




 Shares PE and CSC views on targeting non-
violent extremism (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 
2009; Mohammad & Siddiqui 2013:26); 
Husain (2007:275, 279) criticised government 
for lack of challenge to groups like HT, 
claiming it would lead to another generation 
of radicalised young Muslims 
 No platforms for views that differ 
from mainstream “British values” 
(HM Government 2015c:7) 
 
Controversy over definitions 
Examined here are two of the most controversial neoconservative-influenced 
definitions in Prevent, impacting greatly on its work (Mohammad and Siddiqui 2013:9), and 
key to understanding criticisms of its approach.16  
First of all, ‘extremism’ is understood as “the vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and 
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs,” as well as “calls for the death of 
members of our armed forced, whether in this country or overseas” (HM Government 
2015c:21). The myriad of problems with this definition will be touched upon throughout, 
including problems with its brevity, as well as being inherently contradictory. It does not 
allow one to express beliefs outside of the mainstream, despite claiming to advocate 
individual liberty, respect and tolerance.  
Another definition to highlight at this point is of “vulnerable to radicalisation.” 
‘Vulnerability’ describes the “factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to 
radicalisation,” while ‘radicalisation’ is “the process by which a person comes to support 
terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups” (HM Government 
2015c:21). These twelve susceptibility factors include peer pressure, family tensions, lack of 
                                                 
15 Founded by disillusioned-former-extremist Ed Husain, which is thought to add legitimacy to Quilliam’s 
recommendations (Kundnani 2015:16-17; Miller and Sabir 2012:14). It will be interesting to see how the latest 
policy recommendation report from Quilliam impacts Prevent under the Conservative government, calling for a 
“new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of 
community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for 
tackling extremism of all kinds” (Russell and Theodosiou 2015:4). 
16 Criticised for being poorly stated – too broad according to some and too narrow for others, and also for lacking 
legal-grounding (Maher 2011; Mohammad and Siddiqui 2013:8; Francis 2014; Richards 2011, in Ali 2015:140; 
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self-esteem or identity, and personal or political grievances (HM Government 2015a:10). The 
government has also laid out thirteen “psychological hooks,” which encourage engagement 
with an extremist group or ideology, including being at a transitional time of life, relevant 
mental health issues, a desire for status, and a desire for excitement and adventure (HM 
Government 2015a:28).  
While not usually applied to developed countries, these pull-factors may be seen to 
have grounding in the ‘youth bulge’ theory, popular in US policymaking since 9/11, which 
sees young people (aged 15-24 years), for whom there are a lack of opportunities due to the 
group being such a large demographic, as more likely than those outside the ‘bulge’ to be 
susceptible to indoctrination by political and religious extremists regarding “’just’ violence” 
(Heinsohn 2003, in Schomaker 2013:117, 120; Hendrixson 2004:1-2, 12; Zakaria 2001, in 
Urdal 2006:608). This group may be more easily attracted to ideas because of their optimism 
in being able to change their situation, deemed unfair, meaning youth bulges provide good 
recruitment opportunities for extremists or terrorists (Urdal 2006:610, 624). The result of 
empirical studies on these issues and their relationship to terrorism are not consistent, but the 
theory has not always faced proper scrutiny (Schomaker 2013:120; Hendrixson 2004:3). 
Hendrixson (2004:16) argues that the ‘youth bulge’ theory “disrespects the younger 
generation, underestimates it’s potential, and leaves it devalued,” which, if true, serves to 
perpetuate factors the government understands to push people towards radicalisation.  
It is perhaps at this point that the term ‘ideology’ itself may be acknowledged as one 
to cause much of the confusion and poor decision making around preventing extremism in the 
UK. Ideology is understood and defined very differently by various groups and individuals. In 
defining Islamist extremism as an ideology, the government describes it as being based on a 
“distorted interpretation of Islam,” drawn from the teachings of those such as Sayyid Qutb, 
but goes further to include the idea that adhering to the extremist ideology also means 
believing that Western interventions in Muslim countries are seen as part of a war on Islam, as 
well as rejecting liberal democratic ideas (HM Government 2013:1-2). It is associated with 
violence, and, as the ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory stresses, extreme ideas will lead to violent 
actions. When aligned more to the idea of social movements however, particularly in the 
Western anti-war period of the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of ideology was often associated 
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freedom and its liberal democratic associates (Snow 2004:382). It has also been argued, in 
discussions around mobilisation, that grievances play an insignificant role since they are 
omnipresent and so do not act as a trigger (McCarthy and Zald 1977, in Snow 2004:382). 
Aligning these ideas to the framing process literature, as Snow (2004:386) has eloquently 
explained, added a further, and perhaps more useful dimension, to the understanding of 
ideology and how it may be used, or indeed, created, for the gain of one or another’s agenda. 
This is something that may be relevant to this debate around the use of terminology, in that 
the government has defined the subject to be tackled, which reinforces its strategies to tackle 
it. But ultimately, “the adherence to an ideology that combines political and religious 
components to become an effective motivational factor is strengthened by the influence of 
other rational, emotional and identitarian variables” (Reinares et al 2008:14). That is to say 
that the wider context of an individual’s life and experiences, their worldview, influences their 
interpretation of an ideology - something which the Neo-Weberian approach explains, but that 
Prevent does not acknowledge.  
 
Context is key 
This controversy around understanding is at the core of this paper’s critique of 
Prevent. While Prevent acknowledges grievances are a factor in radicalisation, it fails to 
appreciate that these grievances influence interpretations of religion or ideology, and vice 
versa. Radicalisation is not caused by mere ‘exploitation’ by extremist ideology; it is about 
how people see the world because of how they have experienced the world. As Kundnani 
(2015:14, 25) highlights in his discussion around Crenshaw’s theory on terrorism, there is a 
lack of contextualisation in contemporary thinking on radicalisation, and so he praises 
Gunning and Jackson’s (2011:380) work for urging that any explanation that is ideational 
must “be meticulously contextualised, and the role of beliefs analysed rather than a priori 
assumed.” The lack of holistic understanding or analysis that Prevent incorporates is 
undermining its potential for success. The “Euro-American secularist epistemologies,” that 
cause laicism to be the cultural backdrop of British engagement with extremist ideology, 
means the government is perhaps falsely claiming to be objectively presenting extremism, or 
radicalisation – especially given the focus on Islam over other religions or ideologies – as the 
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which religion can play a key role in politics (Shakman-Hurd 2008:117-118; Thomas, S. M. 
2005:21, 45). These epistemologies may be understood as Halliday’s (2000:52) “hegemony” 
to control, what in this case is, Muslims. For Gramsci, “hegemony works by creating a 
cultural system that promotes consent and which serves to legitimate the position of the 
rulers” (Halliday 2000:61), which can clearly be linked to the “British value” of democracy. 
This is also largely in line with Foucault’s ideas on governance, particularly if cultural 
hegemony is considered as that which makes the ways of the governors the ways of society, 
which further serves to reproduce those ways (Halliday 2000:61, 64).  
These positivist ideas around secularism are deeply entrenched, dating back to the 
Treaty of Westphalia, and reinforced during the Enlightenment era, by philosophers including 
Weber, Durkheim, and Marx (Thomas, S. M. 2000:819; Gunning and Jackson 2011:375; 
Bellin 2008:316-317; Thomas, S. M. 2005:49). While these philosophers have some 
particularly interesting offerings on religion, for this paper it is more useful to take 
MacIntyre’s (2000, in Thomas, S. M. 2005:216) lead and reject Enlightenment’s assumptions 
on religion and rationality, turning instead to Lynch’s Neo-Weberian approach. Lynch 
(2009:381) provides a theoretical understanding of “how religious adherents connect religious 
guidelines to moral action,” incorporating the concepts of “common good” and “popular 
casuistry” into Weber’s understanding of religious belief and economic, social, and political 
practice. In praising the approach, Sheikh (2012:377-378), in line with Gunning and Jackson’s 
(2011:383) push for contextualisation, explains that in order to understand how religious 
doctrines are used and interpreted by different groups, one must look at the socio-political and 
economic contexts in which religious actors refer to ethnical constructs. An important focus in 
the study of radicalisation, and indeed of the imagery of a cosmic war that is part of the 
rhetoric of those wanting to draw young Muslims to Syria, should be “religious interpretations 
of social reality” (Sheikh 2012:379).  
In line with postliberal theologian Lindbeck’s “’cultural-linguistic’ concept of 
religious doctrines” (Sheikh 2012:378), Lynch (2009:399) argues that “decisions about how 
to act ethically within a given religious tradition” are influenced by ideas about individual and 
common gain, which themselves are shaped by “intersubjective interpretations of religious 
rules and texts along with lived experience.” It is not as simple as to say that “doctrines that 
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standing idea grounded in much of the literature on religious terrorism in Western social 
science, which tends to express a causal relationship between religion and violence (Gunning 
and Jackson 2011:379). Philosophy’s “linguistic turn,” primarily through Constructivism, 
attributed to Wittgenstein’s (1922, 1958, in Fierke 2007:311) influence, has contributed to a 
“new understanding of the relationship between language and reality” whereby interpretation 
is indispensable, as language is “embedded in social practice” (Rorty 1967, in Campbell 
2007:209-210), “bound up in the world rather than a mirror of it” (Fierke 2007:173-174). This 
means religious doctrines can be interpreted differently by different people – an idea which 
Prevent does not seem to have engaged with. Scripture, as such, for Lindbeck (1984, in 
Gerrish 1988:92), functions “as the lens through which the world is viewed,” in an 
“intratextual” theology, hence doctrines do not determine action (Lynch 2014:281). The 
government’s understanding of terrorism is marred by its failure to try to understand how 
terrorists understand “their goals, values, and passions,” which, while perhaps based on 
religious traditions, are interlinked with “identity, thought, and experience” (Thomas, S. M. 
2005:89-90). The struggle that occurs between interpretation and action are constitutive, not 
discrete, and therefore not linear (Lynch 2014:283), which explains why the ‘Conveyor Belt’ 
theory is not complex enough to explain the radicalisation ‘process’.  
Lynch (2009:393) explains that, upon realising there is “evil and suffering in the 
world,” religious doctrines can potentially “promote retreat from the world” and its injustices. 
This is critical for understanding some ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’ proponents of Islam, who 
encourage a withdrawal from Western norms or ‘values,’ such as democracy, on account of 
the West being the perpetrator of evil or suffering. However, not all groups or ‘radicals’ will 
read religious doctrines in this way, and this is a crucial point. What is considered a rational 
response is embedded in a particular community’s concept of good (Thomas, S. M. 2005:90). 
As Esposito (1999:207) and Sedgwick (2010:481) note, misunderstanding that Islamic groups 
are very diverse and multi-issue has an impact on comprehending extremism. This has 
implications for identifying who is vulnerable to radicalisation, and has had a major effect on 
“dubious” counterterrorism policies, which ultimately calls for a “systematic critique” of 
“core claims” in the “’religious terrorism’ model” (Gunning and Jackson 2011:370, 373-374). 
A Neo-Weberian analysis of the “current fascination with Islam in international politics” 
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that should be being made, which is about the actions of particular groups to achieve certain 
aims, and what “repercussions” they have, undermining “non-analytical indictments of 
Islamists” such as “they hate our way of life” (Lynch 2009:402; Esposito and Mogahed 
2007:35). The empirical support for religious terrorism is very inconsistent, but also the 
“inbuilt assumptions” of religious terrorism as a term “function to obscure ways in which 
religion, as a set of cultural-linguistic practices, could also be a ‘solution’ to terrorism” 
(Gunning and Jackson 2011:378, 382). As S. M. Thomas (2015:67) explains, using political 
theology to distinguish religious movements from secular ones ignores how “(secular) 
political philosophy…is itself a type of political theology,” thereby making it easier to 
“scapegoat” religious philosophies. The application of “religious” to extremism, or 
particularly terrorism, leaves questions unanswered, regarding how it can be distinguished 
from secular violence, and who has the legitimacy to do so (Gunning and Jackson 2011:370, 
376). 
Through the following sections, this paper will continue to highlight the importance of 
cultural-linguistic epistemology and contextualisation of interpretations, indeed the need to 
“(kick) the secularist habit” (Brooks 2003, in Thomas, S. M. 2005:7), while identifying where 
Prevent has failed to express an understanding of this importance, and what detrimental 
effects that has.  
 
It’s all in the ideology…Or is it? 
 
Prevent understands radicalisation to be “driven by ideology, by a number of people who set 
out to disseminate these ideologies, and by vulnerabilities in people which make them 
susceptible to a message of violence” (HM Government 2011:60). Those who set out to 
disseminate ideologies, “radicalisers,” intentionally “exploit grievances,” which, where Al 
Qa’ida-inspired terrorism is concerned, “include a perception of (UK) foreign policy, the 
experience of Islamophobia, and a broader view that the West is at war with Islam itself” (HM 
Government 2011:60). According to former PM David Cameron (2015, in Deardon 2015), 
“the root cause of the threat we face is the extremist ideology itself,” which is more resilient 
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This focus on ideology however has been described as “dangerous and ill-informed” 
(Armstrong 2015, in Verkeik 2015). Ibrahim Mohamoud (2015, in Verkeik 2015), of 
advocacy group Cage,17 has claimed, in line with work by Bjorgo and Horgan (2009, in 
Elshimi 2015a:210), that Prevent “has no peer-reviewed evidentiary basis showing a link 
between violence and ideology.” Ramzan (2015) on the other hand has said that “denying the 
role of ideology is absurd,” citing examples of young, middleclass Muslims, without apparent 
socio-economic concerns, who have fled to Syria to fight a violent jihad. The ideology is 
understood to be “based on a distorted interpretation of Islam, which betrays Islam’s peaceful 
principles, and draws on the teachings of the likes of Sayyid Qutb” (HM Government 2013:1-
2). Successful radicalisation hinges on this narrative being attractive to and mobilising 
Muslims to participate in violence (Home Office 2009, in Githens-Mazer 2010a:48-49). The 
rhetoric that has been built throughout the development of Prevent therefore has expressed a 
need for a counter-narrative, which theologians and communities have a role in contributing 
to18 (HM Government 2011:61). But, according to Murry (2010), the government was wrong 
to aim to tackle radicalisation by trying to create an Al Qa’ida counter-narrative, and that has 
contributed to Prevent’s failure, especially since this counter-narrative is essentially, poorly-
defined, “British values” (Martin 2015:190, 196; Qureshi 2015:182). Moreover, heavy police 
involvement in something that theologians and communities are supposed to lead is blurring 
the lines between different strands of CONTEST, deepening the counter-productive nature of 
Prevent.  
 
Rebel Without A Cause  
A broader, and therefore better, understanding of radicalisation would look beyond 
ideology and give more attention to the fact young Muslims may feel as though they do not fit 
into British culture, that they are economically and socially marginalised, and disagree with 
foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere. While Prevent acknowledges grievances 
may have a part in radicalisation, these lived experiences are not taken seriously enough, 
since it has not been taken on board that they shape interpretation of religious doctrines, and 
                                                 
17 Directly criticised by former PM Cameron (2015, in Deardon 2015), and co-founder of Inspire, Sara Khan 
(2015, in Preston 2015). Inspire tries to stop young girls especially travelling to Syria; work embodied in Khan’s 
(2015) open letter to all Muslim girls of the UK. 
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so have not been properly tackled. The government instead highlights its comfort zones of 
theology and psychology, often leaving radicals to be deemed “rebel(s) without a cause” 
(Sedgwick 2010:481; Kundnani 2012:6). David Cameron (2015) has said that, “it is a problem 
that so many see the West as an oppressor, and buy into the grievances, if not necessarily the 
violence,” somewhat in line with Juergensmeyer’s (2003:194) notion that terrorists buy into 
an “ideology that explains the source of their problems and gives them hope.” However, 
Prevent does not strive to really comprehend why this is the case, exemplified by the fact the 
strategy negates engagement with those it deems extremist. This, unfortunately, significantly 
hinders a comprehension of ideology through a Neo-Weberian lens.  
Refraining from engaging with extremist groups was a key point of the 2011 Prevent 
that diverged from previous Labour strategies (HM Government 2011:60), part of Cameron’s 
“muscular liberalism” agenda (O’Toole et al 2015:10; Wintour 2011).19 This paper deems the 
non-engagement approach problematic, agreeing with scholars such as Esposito (2011:379), 
and commentators such as Macleod (2016), who believe that extremist’s or potential 
extremist’s concerns must be identified and understood in order to combat terrorism. The 
need for good dialogue with extremists has also been expressed by David Anderson QC 
(2016b:24), Gunning and Jackson (2011:383), and Spalek and Lambert (2010:110), and is 
further supported by O’Toole et al’s (2015:10) research, highlighting the importance of 
working with “hardline” not just “cuddly” groups, if radicalisation is ever to be prevented.  
Journalist, Todenhofer (2014, in Withnall 2014; 2015), is another proponent of this 
approach, hence why he travelled to Syria to spend time with ISIS members. Todenhofer 
(2015) found that Western members of ISIS had left their home countries because they felt 
discriminated against there, believe the Western wars in the Middle East are unfair and 
unjustified, and are told they are waging a historic war between good and evil. This is perhaps 
                                                 
19 This is a reference to Cameron’s February 2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference. The move to 
“muscular liberalism” followed accusations of over-engagement and funding of extremists. Prevent had been 
deemed a “cash cow” for enterprising Muslim groups, who could receive funding for cohesion work, thereby 
undermining the success of Prevent, both in terms of securitising integration, and also creating resentment 
among those not able to access these communal projects, leading to a rise in ‘Islamophobia’ (Murry 2010; 
Brandon 2014; Stern and Berger 2015:248; Thomas, P. 2015b:42; Ramzan 2015; Hörnqvist and Flyghed 
2012:330-331). Prevent itself reports that previous funds “inadvertently reached organisations that had extremist 
connections or held extremist views” (HM Government 2011:62), which it has been suggested included the 
Brixton-based Strategy to Reach, Empower and Educate programme for example (Martin 2015:197; Elshimi 
2015a:208). The U-Turn on engagement is now having negative effects on an international scale however, as aid 
is being diverted away from Islamic charities engaged in crucial development and humanitarian work overseas, 
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the kind of rhetoric that a counter-narrative needs to be formed against, by theologians and 
communities, as it demonstrates the manipulation of religion. But by engaging with groups 
like ISIS, for the first time some of these fighters are being told they are important, that they 
have a purpose (Todenhofer 2015). Todenhofer has however faced some intense criticism for 
his journalistic approach, and for crossing the line between gaining an insight into ISIS and its 
members’ motives, and marketing, glorifying even, the views of ISIS, for example by failing 
to apply perhaps necessary filters (Frankel 2014, in Taylor 2014; Bokhari 2015). It is 
precisely this idea though, that Todenhofer has tried to convey, albeit not entirely 
successfully, that the government should really be trying to tackle: giving everyone a sense of 
purpose in the UK. As Sageman (2013, in Hasan 2013) says, young people vulnerable to 
radicalisation need to feel that they have relevance within the “system.” This relates to 
Juergensmeyer’s (2003:191) notion of “symbolic empowerment,” where young fighters 
search for the “fulfilment” they lack, in religious war – key for foreign fighters fleeing to 
Syria20 (Mironova et al 2014). This may be understood as a contemporary conceptualisation 
of Durkheim’s (2008:10) effervescence, embodying the “eminently social” nature of religion, 
especially since the goal is to build an Islamic State through jihad (Mironova et al 2014). As 
Sachedina (2001:121) has said though, “any jihad that leads to meaningless destruction of 
human life and ignores concerns for peace with justice is non-Koranic jihad,”21 hence the 





                                                 
20 The result of spirituality crises for “Generation X” (Jensen 2009:223), and also for Millennials (Yingling 
2015; Pew Research Center 2010). However, it is generally quite difficult to provide a specific demographic. A 
2008 study by MI5’s behavioural science unit found that “there is no easy way to identify those who become 
involved in terrorism in Britain” but found that that the majority are British nationals, largely in the UK legally 
(Travis 2008). Approximately 50% of these were born in the UK, and those that migrated in later life were more 
likely to have moved to the UK to study or for family or economic reasons, rather than to claim asylum from 
traumatic experiences or oppressive regimes, and became radicalised many years after arrival (Travis 2008). 
This adds rigour to the notion, as explored in section three, that more than a “British values” counter-narrative to 
extremist ideology is needed to prevent radicalisation, because it may be that British culture is not so universally 
attractive after all. 
21 In line with this, Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, the grand mufti, Sheikh Abdulaziz Al al-Sheikh, has deemed ISIS 
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Blame it on the politics 
There are claims from Fraser (2015b), who is supportive of Kundnani’s work on 
Prevent, that at its core, Prevent fails to understand that radicalisation of young Muslims is all 
about politics, not Islamic theology as the government tends to focus on, emphasising the 
need to see radicalisation though Lynch’s Neo-Weberian lens. This means the UK must face 
responsibility, and admit its role, historical and contemporary, in the horrors continuing to 
unfold in the Middle East (Fraser 2015b; Mohammed and Siddiqui 2013:6; Sageman 2013, in 
Hasan 2013; Edwards and Gomis 2011:14; Kilcullen 2016, in Dearden 2016). The 2013 Task 
Force “fails completely to address the foreign policy roots of extremist violence” (Bodi 
2014:6), but “unresolved political problems” must be dealt with in order to tackle 
radicalisation (Islam 2016, in 
Safi 2016; Sedgwick 2014; 
Pettinger 2016:92, 111), as 
highlighted in Figure 1. 
Young British Muslims do 
not flee to Syria because of 
religion, Fraser (2015b) says, 
but rather “because they 
believe their tribe is under 
attack, that Bashar al-Assad is 
dropping chlorine gas, that 
the West invaded Iraq, 
because of torture and 
Guantánamo Bay.” However, 
Scott Appleby (2000:30) believes it is an error “to interpret acts of violence and terrorism 
committed in the name of religion as necessarily motivated by other concerns,” and Hoffman 
(2006, in Gunning and Jackson 2011:371) goes as far to say that “the religious imperative...is 
the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.” Research by MI5 
however has actually shown that religious identity “protects against violent radicalisation” 
(Travis 2008), and Olivier Roy, as highlighted by Kundnani (2015:23; 2012:21) argues that 
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not necessarily lead to violence.” Interpretation of religious practice, or Salafism, is tied up in 
an individual’s, or a group’s, worldview.   
As such, it may be the case that the government is trying to shift responsibility for 
radicalisation onto religion, or those associated with religion, but a move towards such 
scapegoating will greatly reduce the ability of Prevent to tackle the problem (Buzan et al 1998 
and Lausten and Waever 2000, in Thomas, S. M. 2014:320; Fraser 2008). While Prevent 
acknowledges the importance of Western foreign policy in grievances claimed by Islamic 
extremists, and their interpretation of such policy as a ‘war against Islam’ (HM Government 
2011:60), it does not truly acknowledge that the West may actually have a role to play in 
these grievances (Mohammad and Siddiqui 2013:7), or that, due to poor communication on 
the part of the UK, and US, acts that followed President Bush’s declaration of ‘War on 
Terror’ became synonymous for many with ‘war on Islam’ (Spalek and Lambert 2010:107).22 
Foreign policy is considered more of a perceived rather than a real grievance. But as Esposito 
and Mogahed (2008, in Esposito 2011:368) found,23 reactions to the “invasion of Iraq 
underscored the influence of foreign policy on Muslim attitudes towards the West.” The 
controversy of Iraq, and the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, is very important for a whole generation 
of young Muslims who have grown up knowing only conflict, whether physical or verbal, 
between states and Islamic non-state actors (McDonald 2011:179). The provocative and 
confrontational language of the Prevent strategy has not helped to ease the tension this has 
created however, overlooking the importance of the role played by cultural-linguistic 
epistemology among these young Muslims, with a 2006 counter-terrorism document referring 
to an engagement in the “battle of ideas” (HM Government 2006:2), and more recently David 
Cameron (2015) labelled counter-extremism a century-defining “generational battle.”  
Former PM Cameron (2015, in Deardon 2015), and Quilliam’s Husain (2007:277), 
have also said that the “grievance justification,” whereby radicalisation or terrorism is 
attributed to emotions around “historic injustices and recent wars,” must be “challenged,” 
                                                 
22 While the US and UK cannot always be spoken of synonymously, the critique on communications from ex-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, seems as apt for UK foreign policy as it does for 
US. Mullen (2009, in Shanker 2009) believes there must be more concern over what actions communicate, rather 
than how to communicate actions. Communication problems are actually policy and execution problems, argues 
Mullen (2009, in Shanker 2009), as difficulty arises when values or promises are not lived up to, discrediting the 
reputation of the US (or UK, as it may be). That this is a problem is heavily supported by Esposito and 
Mogahed’s (2007:28) research. 
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primarily because 9/11 happened prior to the Iraq War. But this notion is clearly overlooking 
the argument regarding the “disease of Westoxification” (Esposito 1999:13; Bruce 2003:87), 
which Muslim populations worldwide have had to endure.24 Prevent’s failure to allow space 
“to express strongly worded criticisms of foreign policies” is problematic (Kundnani 2015:28-
29), as those who wish to express such opinions are viewed as extremists, not citizens 
exercising their rights to freedom of speech. This is both a problem for civil liberty, 
contradicting the notion of British values, as well as meaning a lack of contextualisation of 
grievances which undermines a good understanding of radicalisation.  
 
Identity Crises 
The application of a cultural-linguistic approach to grievances would provide a 
“richer, narrative conception” (Thomas, S. M. 2005:89) of grievances around identity, felt by 
young people forced to succumb to Western or British norms, and how these lead to violence, 
and the importance of making this link, can be further comprehended by applying the New 
Wars theory (Kaldor 2013:2). Gunning and Jackson (2011:378) claim that “religious 
terrorist(s)” often conform “to the logic of asymmetric rather than cosmic warfare,” as 
acknowledged by Kaldor (2013:6). These “globalisation era” wars are fought in the name of 
identity, as a consequence of the loss of meaning (Kaldor 2013:2; Laïdi 1998:6; Esposito and 
Mogahed 2007:27). This is pertinent for young (and old) Muslims in Britain, who feel 
pressure for example to frequent the local public house in the evenings with peers, despite 
often believing it is morally wrong to consume alcohol (Commission for Racial Equality 
2006:27; Pew Research Center 2013b:76). Discrimination around this topic is particularly an 
issue in working-class communities in the UK, rather than among the middle-class, but has 
even led to Islamophobic-accusations that the increasing Muslim population in the UK is to 
                                                 
24 The “disease of Westoxification,” to varying extents, has been blamed by some for family breakdowns and 
increasing promiscuity, among other things associated with ‘modern’ secular society (Esposito 1999:13; 
Esposito and Mogahed 2007:38). This has had such an effect that where Muslims are a minority, they can be 
expected to seek “a degree of regional autonomy that permits them to live as if they were in a Muslim state” 
(Bruce 2003:188), which, according to Bellin (2008:336) is demonstrated in the way Muslim groups have used 
the decentralised UK education system to pass decisions that would not necessarily be accepted nationally. This 
links to Kepel’s (2004:193) point that political, economic and social criticisms in the name of Islam is a direct 
challenge to the nature of Western modernity exported worldwide, or to what Rancière (2009:95) has identified 
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blame for closures of public houses (Worrall 2015).25 Despite data showing a causal 
relationship between rising numbers of Muslims in the UK and pub closures being non-
existent (Worrall 2015), it does not stop Muslims feeling persecuted in their own 
communities.26 Islamic ideology then has the potential to “superficially” quench the “thirst for 
identification” and acceptance among Muslims (Laïdi 1998:5), offering “a sense 
of…fraternity and cultural values that offset the psychological dislocation and cultural threat” 
of an environment which does not seem to accommodate norms outside of the secular or 
vaguely-Protestant liberal democratic mainstream (Esposito 1999:14). The reasons behind 
why Muslims feel they have a conflictual relationship with the state (Toft et al 2011:135) are 
not adequately explored by Prevent,27 due to a lack of contextualisation, which is the result of 
the non-engagement approach.   
 
Money worries  
Poverty and unemployment are often the grievances cited by those who argue that 
ideology is not at the heart of radicalisation. But a multifaceted path to radicalisation exists, 
and so we need to look beyond economics for why, as S. M. Thomas (2015:71) has 
highlighted, terrorists claim victimhood as a justification for violence, a notion heavily 
supported by Esposito and Mogahed’s research (2007:31). Nevertheless, economics should 
not be overlooked completely. While Mottram’s (2007:50) analysis found that people from 
the UK drawn into terrorism are not generally disadvantaged in terms of education or 
employment, research by Briggs and Birdwell (2009, in Ali 2015:141) found that “Muslims 
are the most disadvantaged faith group in the British labour market,” given that 
unemployment is three times more likely than for the majority Christian group, and “almost 
one-third of Muslims of working age have no qualifications, the highest proportion for any 
faith group.” This is in line with Juergensmeyer’s (2003:195) argument that often extremist 
movements are about “relative deprivation” rather than “extreme poverty.”  
                                                 
25 Detailed accounts of online and off-line anti-Muslim attacks in Tell MAMA study (Awan and Zempi 2015). 
26 Including Muslim students who fear being blamed for alcohol limits on campus (Davis 2012).  
27 Prevent in itself may be considered an ironically counter-productive title. Given that the PM’s Task Force 
(2013:1-2) notes there are difficulties, regarding identity, of being a young Muslim in Britain today, the negative 
connotations of the term ‘prevent’ is an inherently counter-productive title for a strategy that has a focus on 
aiming to reconcile these difficulties. A successful strategy should distance itself from this title (Thomas, P. 
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Khattab (2016, in Cole 2016) believes though that Islamophobia plays a big role here, 
causing Muslims to fall into “the lowest stratum within the country’s racial or ethno-cultural 
system.” Nawaz (2009) has said however that while Muslims generally come from “less-
affluent areas of the UK,” it has nothing to do with their faith, but with “other socioeconomic 
factors” which white working-class people are also facing. This notion is in line with 
Sageman’s (2004 and 2008, in Kundnani 2012:14) rejection of the primacy of economic, and 
even political, grievances, because these “affect millions of people, whereas only a small 
number become terrorists.” Sageman (in Kundnani 2012:14) rejects a focus on religious 
ideology on similar grounds though, arguing instead for analysis on how “terrorists interpret 
the structural conditions with which they are confronted and how they attempt to forge a 
common struggle in response.” This interpretation is supported by Wiktorowicz (2005, in 
Kundnani 2012:17), Bhavani et al (2005, in Abbas 2012:356), as well as Jayaweera and 
Choudhary (2008, in Abbas 2012:356), and reinforces the importance of Lynch’s Neo-
Weberian approach.  
 
Cohesion and Contradictions. 
 
Prevent states there is evidence28 to suggest that an association exists “between support for 
terrorist violence and a rejection of a society where ethnic and faith groups mix easily and 
trust one another – a society which is cohesive and integrated” (HM Government 2011:61). 
Regarding the tick-list of items that may make someone “vulnerable to radicalisation,” 
Prevent adds here that “communities who do not (or in some cases feel they cannot) 
participate in civic society are more likely” to be susceptible, and as such, “a stronger sense of 
belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology” (HM 
Government 2011:61; 2013:4). 
In stating that marginalised people often come to support terrorism, there is an 
inherent assumption made by the government that integration, or social cohesion, can be a 
means of discouraging radicalisation. However, what the government has failed to consider is 
the attractiveness of British culture, or British values, that they aim to integrate the 
marginalised into, briefly touched on in the previous section, and complimented by Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 
This Pew survey of Muslims demonstrates Western culture is not as 




When former PM Cameron 
(2015) said that, “Islamist 
extremists don’t just threaten 
our security, they 
jeopardise…our successful 
multi-racial, multi-faith 
democracy,” he is making a 
presumption of ‘success’ 
which perhaps he should not, 
given that so many minority 
groups have long expressed 
extensive grievances 
(Commission for Racial 
Equality 2006:27).29 A secular, liberal, individualist society is not always what everyone 
wants, indeed it is very different to some community-focused Asian cultures (Diokno 
2000:74), although Laïdi (1998:147) contends the incompatibility of communitarianism with 
a market-oriented UK. Nevertheless, as counter-terrorism policymakers and practitioners seek 
out the “parentage” and try to retrace the “genealogy” (Kepel 2004:11) of the movements they 




Critics believe the specific theory of change that assumes not adhering to “British 
values” can lead to terrorism (Kundnani 2015:37) is worrying, even “absurd” (Faris 2015, in 
Preston 2015), given how vague the term is.30 The overly-simplistic understanding of 
‘extreme,’ and focusing on the importance of ideas rather than wider socio-political factors, as 
recommended by Lynch, has led to claims by the MCB and Ramadhan Foundation that 
Prevent is encouraging a McCarthyist society, and its failure to engage properly with the 
                                                 
29 “Westoxification” is part of this wider problem. 
30 See section one. Also ambiguous considering how ‘values’ have changed overtime to outlaw slavery, 
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Muslim community is further marginalising this group (Travis 2015).31 Kundnani (2012:16) 
and Mohammad and Siddiqui (2013:7-8), have also noted how the ideological battle against 
radical Islamism has become the new anti-communism, with ‘moderates’ deemed the 21st 
century version of the 1950s’ non-communist Left. S. M. Thomas (2005:48) has referenced 
Almond’s question from as far back as 1950, “why were people attracted to communism” as 
the older model of today’s question, “(why are people) attracted to religious extremism,” and 
this mindset, these questions, are prominent today among academics and practitioners alike.32 
As such, Bodi (2014:12) has expressed concerns that the strategy gives legitimacy to “witch-
hunts” directed at Muslim-led organisations, which perpetuates “vulnerability” to 
radicalisation, as people turn to alternative processes following exclusion from the 
mainstream (Sedgwick 2010:491).  
The notion that there is a link between violent extremism and a rejection of British 
values has been influenced by the arguments of, for example, Quilliam’s Husain (2007:271),33 
but this notion counters Prevent’s legitimacy – particularly around the idea of British values. 
On the one hand these values incorporate “mutual respect and tolerance,” yet Prevent sets out 
that no platform can be given to anyone voicing an opinion pro-something-different-to-the-
mainstream (HM Government 2015c:7, 21). A Foucauldian lens sees the government trying to 
align “practices of the self” with government’s practices (Dean 1997, in O’toole et al 2015:5) 
which will only serve to perpetuate radicalisation, as youth become disillusioned with the 
‘policing’ approach. It must be remembered, as S. M. Thomas (2000:841) has noted, “there is 
a close relationship between religious freedom and political freedom, and religious toleration 
often has been the beginning of political toleration, civil society, and democracy,” 
demonstrating the importance of not marginalising religion, especially a particular religion, if 
the kind of society the UK government claims to desire is to be realised. Kundnani (2015:27), 
supported by Anderson (2015:58-59) and Mohammad and Siddiqui (2013:5), is also critical of 
                                                 
31 The Labour government requested the establishment of the Muslim Council of Britain in 1997, to make it 
easier to govern Muslim groups (Ali 2015:149). “Serious epistemic and institutional challenge” followed, “when 
discussing the nature of the Muslim communities’ problems,” as governments over the past 19 years have failed 
to comprehend the communities’ diversity (Ali 2015:149; Dathan 2015). This has been part of what Ali 
(2015:140) has described as efforts to establish a ‘Muslim community’ of Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Somali 
descendants, in order to determine this “the site of radicalisation in need of governmental reform,” drawing on 
Foucault’s (2007) work on governmentality. This links back to the idea in the introduction of “predictive power” 
being key to strategy implementation. 
32 For example, Hoffman and Kilcullen, in Packer (2006), and Laïdi (1998:5). 
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this move towards what has been considered a form of censorship, noting that the liberal 
values of Britain should mean “governments not deciding that certain ideas are too dangerous 
for citizens to express.” Again, the contradictory nature of this approach may be considered 
part of the wider socio-political factors that influence certain interpretations of religious 
doctrines, which may motivate violence. Mohammad and Siddiqui (2013:50) believe that the 
theory and operation of Prevent “violates individual liberty,” providing the state with 
“unrestricted intrusive powers.” As such, Ali (2015:144), drawing on Foucault, has 
demonstrated how these intrusive powers are “part of a wider logic of governing,” whereby 
liberal ideas are “complicit in…illiberal practices.” The government seems to be willing to 
compromise on all its core values to pursue this contradictory agenda (Hussain 2016), despite 
David Cameron (2015, in Deardon 2015) claiming that these “liberal values” are the 
“strongest weapon” the UK has against the threat of extremism and terrorism. Even the mere 
thought of Prevent, and its leaning towards an introduction of “thought policing,” based on 
the ‘Conveyor Belt’ theory, should “send a shiver down the spine of any liberty loving 
individual,” according to Ahmed (2015).  
Martin (2015:203), Miller et al (2015), Elshimi (2015a:216), and Mohammad and 
Siddiqui (2013:7), have expressed concern that Prevent serves to de-politicise dissent, 
recording it instead as vulnerability or a future violent threat. Prevent as such is encouraging 
self-censorship, and stunting dialogue between families, friends, and communities (Bowcott 
2016; Price 2016) – dialogue which is crucial if “illegitimate political violence” is to be 
diminished (Kundnani 2009:6). Steinem (2016, in Clark 2016), Chakrabarti (2016:32), 
Bartlett and Birdwell (2010:4), Kundnani (2015:7), Sageman (2013, in Hasan 2013), and 
Neumann (2015, in Khaleeli 2015) are among those advocating a counter-narrative which 
involves discussion, and equal time for all voices, rather than trying to silence, and further 
provoke, those which could be dangerous. As Cavanagh (2011) concludes in his critique of 
Prevent, “it could have unhappy consequences for freedom of speech and thought,” which is 
even more prevalent now, following the release of the Prevent Duty. Despite the fact the 
Prevent Duty claims it is not aiming to stop the debate of controversial issues (HM 
Government 2015b:5), institutions subject to the Duty, including universities and schools, 
must try to ‘prevent’ opposition to British values, and so should not provide a platform for 
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hence why Prevent has been met with particular backlash from academia (University of Bath 
Students’ Union 2015; MacDonald 2016, in Adams 2016a; Durodie 2016:25).34 Critics have 
said the Duty expects school teachers to be “the eyes and the ears of the state,” reporting 
children for having views in support of a free Palestine for example (Hooper 2015),35 and this 
contradiction between the freedom of British values and the condemning of ‘inappropriate’ 
views is counter-productive, particularly, as Gunning and Jackson (2011:382) highlight, 
“securitising religious practices, banning particular websites, preachers and texts and profiling 
individuals on religious grounds,” serve to create an atmosphere of suspicion that undermines 
Prevent.36 In a recent report by Quilliam though, there appears to be a move away from 
neoconservative traditions, as the government is urged to adopt Quilliam’s “human-rights 
based definition and approach to extremism” (Russell and Theodosiou 2015:4). This may be a 
good start for reconciling Prevent, as not only will it hopefully move away from contradictory 
definitions, but if properly taken on board, should serve to look at the wider factors of human 
rights, beyond freedom of speech, and, as advocated thus far, deeper contextualisation can 
only help understand the problem of radicalisation.   
 
Community Spirit 
In order to achieve a British ‘society’ in which everyone adheres to these “British 
values,” Prevent is dependent “on a successful integration strategy,” but, crucially, this will 
not deliver Prevent objectives, and neither is Prevent a community integration strategy (HM 
Government 2011:59, 61). The aim here is not to securitise community cohesion, the idea 
behind which is inevitably influenced by the Copenhagen School’s Securitization theory, and 
particularly the idea of a speech act, whereby something that was not a security issue is made 
                                                 
34 HJS’s Sutton (2015a:8) poses however that much university backlash, particularly from students, is influenced 
by ‘extremists’ which Prevent aims to protect people from. 
35 Kenny (2015, in Hooper 2015), of the National Union of Teachers (NUT), has said police have advised 
teachers to “keep an eye” on children who attend demonstrations against Gaza bombings, or who believe the 
West is at war with Islam. Kundnani (2009:7) argues that “to turn public services into instruments of 
surveillance only serves to alienate young people from institutional settings that would otherwise be well-placed 
to give them a sense of trust and belonging.” At the NUT annual conference of March 2016, teachers voted 
overwhelmingly to reject Prevent, a motion moved by Kenny and carried by NUT Secretary General (Adams 
2016b). Quilliam and HJS have argued more training for teachers is what is really needed though (Russell and 
Theodosiou 2015:5; Sutton 2015b). 
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into one by the words of politicians – a causal relationship between “saying” and “doing” 
(Sheikh 2012:383). The Copenhagen School however consider Western foreign policy to have 
“securitised” religion, by intersubjectively creating “religious violence” as a “social fact” that 
needs to be dealt with in extraordinary ways, legitimating “controversial” counter-terrorism 
practices (Buzan et al 1998, and Lausten and Waever 2000, in Thomas, S. M. 2014:320). 
Despite recognising the importance of not securitising integration, the government has not 
been entirely successful in stopping an overlap of anti-radicalisation and social cohesion 
efforts, as respondents in O’Toole et al’s (2015:4, 15) study on the matter expressed, 
concurring with findings by Husband and Alam (2011) and P. Thomas (2012), as well as 
ICSR (2009) and ACPO (2009, in Thomas, P. 2015b:45).37 P. Thomas (2015a:169, 177) 
argues Prevent is undermined by significant securitisation of “the national and local state’s 
relationships with British Muslim communities.” Some argue social cohesion will be further 
jeopardised if the government continues to target violent and non-violent ‘extremists’ alike, as 
it is both “morally reprehensible” and “hugely counter-productive” to treat “law-abiding 
Muslim citizens as a subversive threat” (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2009).  
Ultimately, in aiming to understand the roots of extremism and radicalisation, 
Prevent’s poor definitions and failure to consider the importance of cultural-linguistic 
epistemology, the result of and perpetual justification for not engaging with extremists, means 
it is actually widening “the schism between the ‘Muslim’ us and the British ‘other’” (Hoque 
2015 in Gardner 2015). While Prevent has produced “some positive results” (Thomas, P. 
2015a:169), overall its approach has exacerbated community cohesion problems that it was in 




The Channel programme is a key counter-narrative initiative of the government’s, constituting 
a “multi-agency approach to identify and provide support to individuals,” based on specific 
needs, “who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2015a:3, 5). Channel 
is deemed “appropriate” for anyone who may be vulnerable to becoming involved in any kind 
                                                 
37 Also, individuals and communities targeted based on “Muslim-ness” is counterproductive to cohesion and 
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of terrorism, aiming to address vulnerabilities that can be exploited by radicalisers, but, 
crucially, all involvement is voluntary (HM Government 2015a:5, 6). The government claims 
to have “worked with 50 different faith groups and…over 250 Mosques” through Channel 
(Tucker-Jones 2015), leading supporters to praise the “grassroots” approach (Combes 2013). 
Initially piloted in 2007, in Lambert, South London, and in Northwest England’s Preston, 
Channel was rolled out across England and Wales in April 2012, and aims to “protect 
vulnerable people” by identifying those at risk, assessing that risk, and developing a 
subsequent support plan for individuals (HM Government 2015a:5; Griffith-Dickson et al 
2014:31).  
Critics have argued however that Channel is not proportionate or realistic as too many 
people are being referred who do not require the specific ‘anti-radicalisation’ help that it 
offers, such as a three year old child (Khaleeli 2015; Geigner 2015; Bolton 2015). In 
interviews conducted by Elshimi (2015a:212), de-radicalisation practitioners gave 28 different 
ways of referring to what de-radicalisation is or means, demonstrating a lack of clarity. 
Moreover, Channel “widens the definition of suspicion beyond criminality to much vaguer 
notions” (Kundnani 2015:15), causing increased feelings of suspicion-induced 
marginalisation among Muslim communities, sometimes deeming Channel “anti-Islamic,” 
thereby further causing them to be ‘vulnerable’ to those groups who may seemingly offer 
greater acceptance (Miller and Sabir 2012:12; Mohammad and Siddiqui 2013:13; MCB 2015; 
Price 2016). This representation of Muslims as “risky” and “at risk” (Heath-Kelly 2012, in 
Blackbourn et al 2012:7), perhaps perfectly exemplified by the case of Umm Ahmed (Qureshi 
2015), is confusing and, as such, counterproductive.  
The Home Office (2015, in Verkeik 2015) has hit back at criticisms, particularly 
around referral, stating that, without any other of the twenty-two indicators that make up the 
guidance on a referral to Channel, the “outward expression of faith” does not constitute a 
referral. Given the broad-ranging and generic nature of the other indicators38 however, it is 
likely very easy to pair this factor with several others, in order to constitute a referral. Figures 
cited by Mohammad and Siddiqui (2013:13) believe that this has been the case, as “of the 
2653 referrals (between 2006 and 2013) only 587 were actually assessed, meaning 78% of 
referrals did not need any assessment,” suggesting Channel “lacks clarity” and is “far too 
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widely applied.” These figures are on the rise however, in light of the recent wave of attacks 
across Europe, leading the government to encourage a greater crackdown on any potential 
threats in the UK, particularly through the Prevent Duty. In 2015, 3,955 were reported to 
Channel, a vast increase from the 1,681 reported in 2014, according to figures from the 
National Police Chiefs Council (Halliday 2016). A significant proportion of these referrals 
were children. In the West Midlands for example, 468 of the 788 referrals were aged 19 or 
under, with 68 of those aged nine or under, often referred by education or youth leaders who 
have been almost forced into an environment of fear, meaning hyper-awareness often leads to 
misinterpretations of a child’s behaviour (Halliday 2016). Nationally, of the 3,955 referrals in 
2015, 415 were under the age of ten, and 1,424 were aged between 11 and 15 (Halliday 2016). 
Channel is “under-researched and understudied” (El-Said 2015, in InfoWars 2015), 
lacking “independent and rigorous assessment,” with a worryingly “flimsy” evidence-base 
(Elshimi 2015b:111-112) for the programme’s ability to deradicalise. This hugely undermines 
the programme’s legitimacy, as well as opportunity for success – both of which may be in a 
better position if Prevent appreciated the importance of contextualisation, rather than focusing 
on ideology as the root cause of radicalisation. Hirschfield et al (2012:8) highlight that 
“systematic data analysis” in literature on radicalisation or de-radicalisation is scarce, as is 
empirical data, which means a lack of reliable evidence on what prevention programmes are 
likely to be effective. Moreover, in interviews conducted by Hirschfield et al (2012:10), 
mixed opinions were expressed regarding whether projects were actually reaching those at 
greatest risk of violent extremism.  
 
Reducing support?  
To return to the aims the government hopes to achieve through programmes like 
Channel, as set out in section one, the first is to reduce “support for terrorism of all kinds” in 
the UK (HM Government 2011:60). The government cites the success of “prevention and 
support programmes” like Channel, suggesting they would continue to be successful after the 
1000+ people who had engaged with these interventions up until 2011 had not “reverted to 
terrorist related activity (HM Government 2011:60, 65), and indeed since then, MI5’s Andrew 
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mostly by UK citizens, were stopped between 2005 and 2013. However, this actually appears 
to suggest that the government and supporting services have demonstrated good use of 
intelligence and crime prevention, rather than actually reduced support for terrorism, as 
intended. Rather than stopping radicalisation as such, the government has focused on stopping 
violent attacks, which, while of paramount importance, is the aim of other strands of 
CONTEST, not Prevent (Kundnani 2015:37). According to Brandon (2014) and Tucker-Jones 
(2015) greater emphasis on policing demonstrates that the UK has given up trying to stop 
jihadists from being created. Tembo (2014:130-131) on the other hand does not agree that all 
is lost, arguing that a re-direction of investment from other CONTEST strands into Prevent is 
both vital and realistic, since in the long run, a successful Prevent will render the other strands 
unnecessary. This is perhaps the idea behind the move to target extremism rather than only 
violent extremism, but the government is not approaching this in the right way. Limiting 
human rights will not stop terrorism. Addressing wider socio-political grievances on the other 
hand may change potentially dangerous interpretations of religious doctrines. Conducting 
sentencing that is considered highly unjustified however, such as in the case of Umm Ahmed, 
who was arrested and sentenced for possession of terrorist material - the magazine Inspire, 
which she had been reading in an attempt to better understand the criminal case her brother 
was involved in concerning a terrorism charge (Qureshi 2015:185) - will only serve to 
enhance these grievances.    
 
Providing the mood music39  
This links to the second success criteria, that of ensuring “more effective challenge to 
those extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organisations and used by terrorists to 
legitimise violence” (HM Government 2011:60). The Prevent Duty is key to this, but by 
limiting the ideas that can be given a platform, an “effective challenge” to these views is not 
provided – censorship is not a means by which to stop ideas legitimising violence, and does 
not provide a good balance between civil liberties and national security.40 A well-researched, 
intelligent and convincing, positive counter argument is what needs to be delivered in the face 
of these ideas. Perhaps some inspiration can be taken from the Danish ‘Aarhus Model’, a de-
                                                 
39 Taken from Husain, in Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2009). 
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radicalisation programme focusing on talking through ideas and beliefs, and learning how to 
articulate and defend them in an intelligent manner (Mansel 2015).41 Participants of the 
scheme have described how they view their position within the “system” more favourably 
after talking through their ‘radical’ ideas and the wider implications of them (Mansel 2015) – 
unknowingly advocating a Neo-Weberian lens through which to view radicalisation. 
McDonald (2011:186) has praised interventions by Muslim youth workers in the UK 
regarding discussions of identity, but there has only really been local success thus far, rather 
than national (Carlile 2016:2). Hans Bonte, Belgian mayor and creator of the ‘Vilvoorde 
method’ of de-radicalisation, believes it is important to focus on local successes though, in 
order to tackle the global problem (Marsden, W. 2015; Bonte 2015, in Cendrowicz 2015). As 
such, Prevent would do well to encourage discussion, rather than use “disciplinary 
technology,” whereby subjects, through surveillance, go through a process of “normalising 
judgement” (Foucault 1991, in Elshimi 2015b:120). This is particularly true for cases that 
have been blown out of proportion, such as Umm Ahmed’s, where the stated threat is much 
greater than the likely threat, and there is a misunderstanding of motive, or even action, 
because of what can be seen as cultural ignorance on the part of the government and 
supporting services, be they the police or Channel officers (Qureshi 2015:186, 189). Not only 
does this have negative repercussions for the person involved in the deradicalisation 
interventions, but it also serves to deepen the inability of the government to appreciate that 
action and belief is dependent on worldview, and offering a fellow prisoner some dates to eat 
during Ramadan does not necessarily equate to building an association with another terrorist, 
as it was noted by intervention officers that Ahmed did (Qureshi 2015:189). 
 
Intruding on Internet Imams 
The final aim of Prevent is to ensure “more challenge to and isolation of extremists 
and terrorists operating on the internet” (HM Government 2011:60), in light of it being 
“widely assumed42 that the internet plays a particular role as a tool of radicalisation” (Behr et 
                                                 
41 Model’s concept deemed successful by Liht and Savage’s (2013:44-45) research, which highlights importance 
of discussing exploitable grievances as well as religious beliefs, inspired by Isaiah Berlin’s work on human 
values. 
42 Aly (2010), Awan (2007), Friedland (2009), O’ Rourke (2007), and Tucker (2010) – all in Behr et al 
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al 2013: xi). While the PM’s Task Force boasted that “over 18,000 items of online terrorist 
propaganda” had been removed (HM Government 2013:1), which escalated to 75,000 in the 
following two years (Tucker-Jones 2015), the mishaps the government has been involved in 
regarding online material cannot be disregarded, particularly the detention of Rizwaan Sabir 
for possessing Al Qa’ida material for his masters research – downloaded from a US 
government website (Curtis and Hodgson 2008).  
However, Behr et al (2013:xi) found 
that the internet creates more opportunities 
to become radicalised, and acts as an echo 
chamber for extremist ideas, but it does not 
accelerate the process of radicalisation, 
allow the process to occur without human 
interaction, or increase opportunities for 
self-radicalisation.43 If the internet is a mere 
“echo chamber,” reducing material 
available online will not be enough to 
tackle radicalisation or indeed violent 
acts,44 highlighting the importance of 
providing an intellectual challenge, and 
even perhaps giving more attention to the 





                                                 
43 The result of “good research” (Francis 2014).  
44 Anderson (2016b:27) has urged for more work to be done in collaboration with social media companies 
including Facebook and Twitter in order to seriously combat this issue. Decker (2014:196) has criticised 
Bjorgo’s (2013) Strategies for Preventing Terrorism for failing to address this, arguing that “developing a 
coherent policy to address the role of internet chat rooms, terror web sites and other forms of online terror 
activity should be a high priority.” Sara Khan (2015, in Preston 2015) is also a proponent for internet reform, to 
tackle the “pyramid approach” (Marsden, W. 2015) to recruitment. Atran (2010, in Kundnani 2015:22) has said 
however that Internet Imams, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, do not ‘radicalise’, they are merely “attractors” for those 
who have already decided to take this certain path, although in terms of ISIS propaganda, such figures may 
“catalyse the Islamist extremist’s passage from tacit supporter to active member” (Winter 2015:6). 
Figure 3 
Pew found internet use made Muslims’ perceptions of Western 
culture more favourable; perhaps more focus should be on 
outputting positive messages online, rather than simply reducing 
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Increasing rigour  
Despite the aims that have been set out, as Christmann (2012, in Powers 2013:19-20) 
has rightly said, it is “exceedingly difficult to gauge the real success of Prevent,” as there are 
very few tools “to measure one’s vulnerability to becoming involved in extremism and the 
effect certain programmes may have at reversing such processes.” More rigour must be 
introduced into Prevent success criteria, especially the effectiveness of Channel-like 
initiatives (Christmann 2012, in Powers 2013:19-20; Hirschfield et al 2012:12), and Prevent 
must also be held more accountable on issues of transparency (Ganesh 2016:9; Khan 2016:6; 
Kundnani 2009:6). A lack of transparency, according to David Anderson QC (2016a:3), 
“encourages rumour and mistrust to spread and to fester.” Openness around funding is a 
particular issue (Mohammad and Siddiqui 2013:23), exemplified by the fact Prevent money 
was used to fund ‘Project Champion’ which placed secret CCTV cameras in Muslim areas of 
Birmingham (Tucker-Jones 2015; BBC News 2011; McDonald 2011:180; Lewis 2010).45 In 
light of the need for the government to be able to “defend its policy more robustly” (Ramzan 
2015) then, David Anderson QC (2016a) has pushed for an independent review of Prevent as 
a whole, the case for which Miller and Massoumi (2015) say “has never been stronger.” 
While little has yet to be officially released on the matter, the government are planning 
to introduce a new deradicalisation scheme to build on Channel, which it deems largely 
successful, aimed at those “further down the path to radicalisation” (HM Government 
2016:16). This scheme will offer support that is more intensive, and, where the law allows, 
mandatory (HM Government 2016:16), targeted perhaps towards those returning to the UK 
from Syria, or those who have not yet left the UK but support terrorist ideologies (Ross 2016). 
Considering the lack of Channel’s success however, laid out above, many are sceptical of the 
success this new programme will bring, and there is considerable concern around further 
opaqueness and other human rights issues, particularly as this had been introduced without 
any consultation or discussion (Hooper 2016). While intentions may be good, with basic 
definitions still struggling for clarity, and, as has been argued, policymakers still struggling 
with understanding that interpretations are not universal but in fact very subjective, at present 
the success of the new scheme is doubtful.  
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Conclusion: What now? Better remedies for prevention. 
 
This paper supports the 
proposal for an independent 
review of Prevent, out of 
which should really come 
new success criteria to more 
effectively evaluate Prevent. 
The strategy, and decision-
making around it, should be 
more evidence-based, which 
perhaps means more funding 
for the Research Information 
and Communications Unit 
(RICU) of the Home Office’s 
Office for Security and 
Counter-Terrorism (OSCT). 
In the meantime, some 
suggested improvements for 
Prevent are laid out in the following paragraphs, highlighting the appreciation required for 
wider socio-political factors.  
Prevent cannot be successful without engaging with extremists or radicals, and those 
“vulnerable” to their ideas. What the government should really be doing is investigating what 
these groups are saying is wrong with British society, why and how they are being 
marginalised or what their grievances are, and why they do not want to be integrated, or have 
failed to be so. A British Council (2014) study found “ignorance of other cultures,” “too 
nationalistic,” and “intolerance towards people from other cultures” were among the top five 
worst features of British culture, according to people from other countries, supported by 
Gallup research in Figure 4. At present, the continuation of Prevent rhetoric has potential to 
facilitate “a policy exchange of fears and beliefs across governance domains and entrench 
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Rather than feeling victimised, like a constant suspect, or marginalised because of certain 
beliefs, everyone must feel relevant to and valued in the system, with the freedom and 
opportunities to feel fulfilled politically, socially, economically and spiritually, in a diverse 
yet inclusive mainstream, so long as their cultural norms and desires do not harm others.46 In 
the words of President Obama (2015, in Marsden, W. 2015), governments must “assure every 
person has equal opportunity, a place in society and a future.” 
Kundnani (2015:7), P. Thomas (2015a:170, 183) and Chapman (2016) go as far as to 
say that the government should end Prevent, to, in Kundnani’s words, “avoid nurturing a new 
generation of antagonised and disenfranchised citizens.” If the current programme is to be 
improved, Kundnani (2015:39) recommends the government publicly acknowledges that 
“British identity is continually reshaped” by all residents, and that foreign policy influences 
the context of terrorism, and, crucially, “enable spaces for wide-ranging discussions of 
religious ideology, identity and foreign policy, particularly among young people who feel 
excluded from mainstream politics.” Edwards and Gomis (2011:20) believe the fundamental 
goal to improve Prevent is to move away from the “’them versus us’ approach,” to stop the 
trend of “alienation and isolation.”47 As such, a clear distinction must be made between 
violent and non-violent extremists (Edwards and Gomis 2011:20), as well as removing the 
sense that Prevent is about intelligence gathering, in order to gain more trust from Muslim 
communities, in line with observations by Whewell (2013). Along with Ramadhan 
Foundation’s Mohammad Shafiq (2015, in Travis 2015), Edwards and Gomis (2011:20), 
highlight the importance of engaging the Muslim community through the formation of an 
improved strategy. 
 
A textbook example of how to alienate just about everybody48 
What also needs questioning is whether what is deemed as extremist is fair or realistic. 
As Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2009) have suggested, in line with think-tank Demos, the 
government needs to recognise the diversity of mainstream voices, because some it would 
                                                 
46 In line with liberal principles (Fiss 2003:180). 
47 Identification of an “in-group” and “out-group” within UK exemplifies salience of this issue (MacDonald and 
Hunter 2013:136-137).  
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label extremist, in the grand scheme of things, are actually rather moderate.49 By engaging 
with a broader range of individuals who follow the teachings of Islam, perhaps more research 
could be done on concepts, and whether radicalisation is a really function of Islam, Islamism, 
Salafi-Jihadism, neo-Salafism, or something else entirely (Githens-Mazer 2010b:999). The 
latter may be the wider context through which young Muslims read Islam, Islamism etc., 
hence the need to appreciate Lynch’s Neo-Weberian emphasis on cultural-linguistic 
epistemology. Careful steps must obviously be taken when engaging with a wider range of 
stakeholders, especially former extremists. This is a line that more are now advocating 
though, to use former extremists in deradicalisation schemes. Johnson (2009:30-31), along 
with El-Said (2015), suggests learning from successes around deradicalisation in Egypt 
particularly, as well as Yemen, stating, “if former Islamists cannot tackle the skewed religious 
and historical narratives then there is little hope for others to achieve this.” Aslam et al (2016) 
have also highlighted some successes in this area in South-East Asian countries. S. V. 
Marsden (2015) has further acknowledged the use of former extremists in deradicalisation, 
but has importantly noted that, in terms of aiding reintegration during the deradicalisation 
process, consideration must be taken of the community into which an individual is being 
integrated back into, the significance of which perhaps former extremists would have greater 
practical appreciation of. Former member of Al-Muhajiroun, Adam Deen, is now an expert on 
deradicalisation strategies, and has placed emphasis on halting the normalisation of planning 
terrorist attacks for example, and needing a counter narrative that would make individuals 
rethink the religious narrative being pushed by groups like ISIS (Euronews 2016).  
Such a strategy cannot be dictatorial however. Mohammad and Siddiqui (2013:54) are 
in agreement with Kundnani (2015:7) that “Prevent-style policies” are dangerously counter-
productive, and believe that “instead of talking about foreign policy radicalising Muslims in 
the future we may well be talking about domestic policy radicalising Muslims.” In order to 
“stay safe”, a “less confrontational approach” must be taken, through reform of “thoughts, 
attitudes, and policing” (Hasan 2011; Kherbane 2015). Policymakers would do well to adhere 
to Hirschfield et al’s (2012:12) push for Prevent-style projects to give young people “the 
ability to think independently and equip them with the cognitive tools needed to reflect 
                                                 
49 The praise Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn received for his work, as MP, to oust extremists at Finsbury Park 
mosque (Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2009) suggests the approach could have been very different had there been 
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critically upon extremist narratives and where necessary, challenge them directly.” Prevent 
should be more about educating and building resilient and articulate individuals with the 
ability to debate and discuss in a respectful, inquisitive and intelligent manner. This is a 
concept the ICSR and Club de Madrid, as part of a “global policy dialogue,” have urged 
world leaders to agree on and implement (ICSR 2015). 
Everyone, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, must feel valued in their society, as 
though their opinions are respected, and that their grievances are both correctly understood 
and addressed, or at least discussed in a serious manner. While not writing specifically about 
Prevent, and indeed about the US rather than the UK, Esposito (2011:393) convincingly 
argues that,  
“Looking to the future, a new paradigm is needed, one that sees 
beyond the smokescreen created by neoconservative and anti-
immigrant ideologues, by Islamophobic experts and political 
commentators, and by autocratic rulers stressing the threat of global 
terrorism to repress any and all domestic opposition.”  
 
Rather than, as this paradigm emphasises, focussing on ideas, ideology, and the radicalising 
nature of religious doctrines, a new paradigm would be a more effective lens through which to 
view, and make policies on, radicalisation, if it took on board the importance of lived 
experience in interpreting scriptures, appreciating the linguistic turn of philosophy that 
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